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1.1 Introductory Remarks 
Driven by diverse forces – economic pressures and opportunities, climate 
change, war, conquest, and transformation of political regimes – human 
migration has been central to circulation of knowledge and values, goods and 
labour. Yet, it has been subject to mainly disciplinary inquiries and the existing 
body of studies has lacked a comprehensive perspective. This volume essays 
precisely such a more comprehensive historical and experiential perspective, 
and as a result leads us to reconsider the meanings of ‘human’, ‘movement’, 
and ‘borders’. 
 The ‘migration-development-security’ nexus has deep historical roots 
set in the construction of the modern state, but has only recently emerged as 
subject of a self-conscious discursive field. It has been influenced by the 
changing modalities of governing, with processes of neoliberal globalization 
contributing to the intensification of the existing forms and the creation of new 
transnational forms of migration. The acceleration of globalization has 
produced unprecedented transnational flows (of finance, goods, ideas, people, 
small weapons and substances), changed the organizational frameworks that 
facilitate them, and altered the workings of the modern nation-state in dramatic 
ways. A host of complex questions have been raised regarding how the 
organization of these cross-border flows undermines, or alters, state authority 
over national security and people’s security in daily lives. The sociological, 
political and economic drivers behind these flows, the multifaceted identities of 
their actors, and the permeability of territorial, cultural and political borders 
reveal the limits of the traditional conception of the ‘nation-state’ and the need 
to rethink its dynamic construction beyond a self-identified and fixed entity.  
 The ongoing reconfiguration of borders manifests attempts to revise this 
centuries-old concept which has sought to integrate the meaning of a 
geopolitical entity with a cultural and/or ethnic entity. ‘Re-bundling’ of 
economic, social and cultural affinities at regional levels is one way to provide 
more effectiveness in the management of resources and human flows, given the 
lack of consensus at the global level. The management of human flows remains 
particularly problematic due to the tension between legal approaches that judge 
the legitimacy of border crossing according to a codification system of singular 
reasons for movement (business, tourism, employment, education, asylum-
seeking, or family reunion) and the sociological realities that involve 
intermeshing motives and evolving human relationships within and across 
borders. Although migrants’ choices are conditioned by legislation, their 
actions also transform the legal space. For this and other reasons, the migration 
policy domain is essentially interactive and can be torn by competing goals and 
rationalities.  
 
 
 2 
 Foucault’s insights into the mechanisms of societal control and the 
delimitation of scientific discourses are suggestive for exploring the ‘migration-
development-security’ nexus. He emphasizes the need for attentiveness to the 
institutional context of emergence of mechanisms and discourses, and to how 
different ideas have been brought into a field of intervention and become 
enacted in particular directions (Gutting 1994). Questioning the fundamental 
epistemological and ontological assumptions that are prevalent and exploring 
their biases and how they drive the dynamics of practice are fundamental to 
understand current social tensions and find possible ways of transformation.  
 This volume tries to bridge the divides in social thought between 
explanation and justification, and between philosophical and substantive 
concerns. In doing so it is part of a wider search for new pathways for change.  
Approaching the subject of migration by way of revisiting presuppositions that 
have been taken as givens, and exploring their role in shaping rules and 
institutions governing the movements of people across borders, have helped to 
reveal the mentalities and rationalities that made up, and continue to make up, 
the reality of today.  
 The essays contained here reveal aspects of power and privilege set 
within the discursive field of international migration at its intersection with two 
other discursive fields, development and security, with attention to the human 
implications. The essays bring to the fore areas that require more systematic 
assessment of the knowledge claims that inform migration policy regulation, 
penalties and incentives, and the modalities of intervention, in order to draw 
lessons for theory and practice. Time-bound and historically situated meanings 
ascribed to human movement across borders vary greatly. Territoriality, 
sovereignty and their reconfigurations play a central role in shaping such social 
meanings, which affect lives and experiences of the subjects of migration 
themselves. The volume attempts a cross-disciplinary way forward in 
contemporary understanding of international migration and its links with both 
development and human security as research fields and policy domains.  
Collins’ (2000) concept of matrix of domination, derived from 
Foucault’s knowledge/power apparatus, addresses interlocking systems of 
oppression and disempowerment (race, class and gender) by shifting social 
thought away from the conventional additive approach to relations of 
dominance. She reveals how different systems of domination may operate 
through reliance (in varying degrees) on mechanisms that can acquire 
simultaneously a systemic and interpersonal nature. Her matrix of domination 
is relevant to migration as a field of intervention and its intersections with the 
two associated fields of security and development. An adjusted version of this 
matrix for our purposes contains the following:  
1) A hegemonic dimension: how ideology, culture, knowledge and 
consciousness can lend legitimacy to the workings of power in the 
delimitations of human movement as a subject of study and field of 
intervention.  
2) An institutional dimension: how dominant values, norms and beliefs produce 
and reproduce practices that define ‘security’ in relation to forms of human 
movement in particular ways.  
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3) A disciplinary dimension: how bureaucracy and surveillance practices that 
use these values play an important role in hiding the effects of structural 
inequality among the population on the move.   
4) An interpersonal and inter-group dimension: how the first three dimensions 
are played out in everyday life situations and affect people on the move 
under specific circumstances. 
 The next two sections in this introductory chapter sketch the domains of 
migration, security and development, and suggest their interconnections in 
terms of the dimensions mentioned above. We highlight key dividing issues, 
and identify areas for reflection, conversation and action on different ethical 
frameworks in relation to migration, within a core concern for the improvement 
of the position of groups subjected to various forms of disempowerment.  
 
1.2 The ‘Migration-Security-Development’ 
Nexus: Danger and Opportunity 
1.2.1  Migration and security 
The term ‘migration’ stems from the Latin root migrare, meaning to move from 
one place to another. It first appeared in the English language in the 1610s, 
referring to persons, and in the 1640s referring to animals.
1
 Today the term also 
refers to a variety of movements, amongst them the processes of transferring 
data between storage types, formats or computer systems, or the movement of 
microorganisms between people, animals and plants. It is clear that migration of 
diverse kinds is essential to life in all aspects, and that for humans migration 
involves organization, change and adjustment.  
 Surveillance of human movement has been a core activity for modern 
nation-states since their inception in the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries in Europe. 
Foucault (1975) traced the historical transformation of discipline and 
punishment associated with the rise of the modern state and provided insights 
into why and how human migration became an issue for state surveillance. 
Begun as a system of permanent registration of the population in a given 
locality in order to control the plague, systems of registration became extended 
to the documentation of growing floating populations in urban areas. With 
population dislocation and pauperization growing as the capitalist system took 
hold, anti-nomadic techniques – such as workhouses, schools and induction to 
the military – were adopted to neutralize dangers, fix those people seen as 
‘useless or disturbed populations’, and avoid the inconveniences and perceived 
threat of over-large assemblies. Over time, the function of these techniques of 
power was adapted to take up a more positive role in the society – notably to 
increase the possible utility of the individuals subjected to these techniques of 
surveillance – in other words, to make them ‘productive’. This inversion of the 
functionality of power – from repressive to ‘enabling’ – initiated the formation 
of a disciplinary society, connected to the broader historical processes of 
economic, juridico-political and scientific reform in the search for progress.
2
  
                                                        
1
 See at: <http://www.etymonline.com/index.phip?term=migration> (30 January, 2010)  
2
 See at: <http://foucault.info/documents/disciplineAndPunish/foucault.disciplineAndPunish. 
panOpticism.html> (14 September, 2009) 
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 Viewed from this vantage point, human movement between different 
localities within modern Europe was originally framed in the negative terms of 
a danger to society.3 But over time, with transformations of production 
relations and the recognition of migration as a structural and durable 
phenomenon with far-reaching economic, social and political consequences, the 
notion of ‘danger/threat’ started to be juxtaposed with that of ‘opportunity’.  
 Torpey’s (2000) analysis of the gradual emergence of the passport over 
the past three centuries extends Foucault’s insights on state surveillance of 
population movements and complements two key perspectives in historical 
analyses of the state. These are Marx’s concept of appropriation of the means of 
production by the capitalist classes, and Weber’s concept of appropriation of 
the means of violence and the control of their legitimate use by the state. 
Torpey emphasizes a third dimension of processes of appropriation and 
monopoly: that of “the legitimate means of movement” (2000: 1).  
 Torpey shows that the passport was not an invention of the early 20
th
 
century, but of a much earlier era. Monopolization of the right to authorize and 
regulate movements has been intrinsic to the state, even in its early modern 
form. The progressive advance of the use of the passport as a means of 
controlling population movements today expresses the ‘stateness’ of states and 
their power to provide an ‘identity’ – a national identity – for citizens, which is 
not independent of the documents that ‘prove’ it. It distinguishes the 
‘national/citizen’ from the ‘alien’ and from the undocumented. Without this 
passport as a document of national identity, not only is identity unknowable, it 
is non-existent from a legal perspective. Although a national identity gives 
access to rights, and can be therefore crucial to livelihood, people can only 
enter it on stringent conditions and escape from it with difficulty. This 
monopolization has the effect of reinforcing an interlinked set of processes. 
They include:  
the (gradual) definition of states everywhere – at least from the point of view of the 
international system – as ‘national’ (i.e., as ‘nation-states’ comprised of members 
understood as nationals); the codification of laws establishing which types of 
persons may move within or across their borders, and determining how, when and 
where they may do so; the stimulation of the worldwide development of techniques 
for uniquely and unambiguously identifying each and every person on the face of 
the globe, from birth to death; the construction of bureaucracies designed to 
implement this regime of identification and to scrutinize persons and documents in 
order to verify identities; and the creation of a body of legal norms designed to 
adjudicate claims by individuals to enter into particular spaces and territories 
(Torpey 2000: 7).  
 A product of incremental juridico-political reform, the passport joined 
the repressive side of state discipline to its enabling side. State-security and the 
security of its citizens or nationals were connected through this means. The 
question of states accepting aliens from other countries arose as an issue during 
the two World Wars, owing to rising concerns for institutional accountability 
                                                        
3
 According to Bader (2005), in the Western world, membership regimes in the city-states of 
classical Greece were severely restrictive. Aristotle who initiated a long tradition of 
republican exclusionism declared them legitimate. The subsequent decline of the city-states 
and the rise of the Roman Empire saw unprecedented freedom of movement and multiple-
citizenship, supported by the idea of cosmopolitanism and moral inclusiveness.  
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for the massive movements of refugees across the continents. Ambivalence 
about state accountability was evident (O’Brien 2003) and has persisted until 
today.  Nevertheless, the legacy of inter-state collaboration did provide a certain 
degree of institutional accountability for international labour migrants as guest 
workers (Cholewinski 1994) and for refugees, most of whom would be today 
termed ‘forced migrants’ or ‘asylum seekers’. For many countries today, the 
economic utility of aliens has become the prime criterion by which to assess the 
impact of in-migration.  
 Cross-border migration patterns since the end of the Cold War show 
complex characteristics that pose new challenges to established notions of 
identity and security. Attempts to address problems arising from cross border 
migration have given birth to several different policy agendas on migration in 
development cooperation:  
1) Post-conflict reconstruction, durable solutions for refugees, and co-develop-
ment to stem the outflows of economic migrants;  
2) Control over movements facilitated by privately organized networks that 
challenge state surveillance and undermine state security;
4
  
3) Economic costs and benefits of migration to sending and receiving countries; 
4) Globalization, the knowledge economy and the supply of talents. 
Government control is compartmentalized into these separate policy agendas 
and remains too within the dualistic frame of ‘danger’ (to be contained) and 
‘opportunity’ (to be promoted). Taking into account the mixed forces that often 
drive the migration processes remains a challenge for policymakers.  
 From a developmental and North-South perspective, although the 
volumes of the flows of people and remittances are often referred to as a key 
concern, there is reason to think that the politics of human migration and its 
relationship with the nation-state are really the core issues. In 2003, the United 
Nations estimated that the total number of international migrants in the world 
stood at 175 million in 2000, up from 154 million in 1990, or about three per 
cent of the total world population.
5
 Today the estimated stock of people living 
outside their country of birth is 214 million in 2010, or 3.1 per cent of the total 
world population of 6.9 billion. The statistical picture shows gravitation from 
low to high-income areas, suggesting that cross-border labour migration is to a 
great extent an issue of security of livelihood and economic advancement.
6
 By 
                                                        
4
 For example, in the case of Canada, Bear (1999) illustrates seven distinct categories of 
migrants based on their entry status and long-term status, being: 1) legal-legal (legal entry 
and legal immigration); 2) illegal-legal (illegal entry under false or undocumented methods 
with the goal to change status after arrival); 3) legal-illegal (legal entry with time-specific 
visas and overstay); 4) illegal-illegal (by independent means such as own-account or through 
friends); 5) illegal-illegal (by indentured means such as through the service of organized 
crime networks who prepay migration costs to be repaid after successful entry, sometimes 
even when entry is unsuccessful); 6) legal-legal (through similar indentured means as under 
5, but with a legal status); 7) internal migration (mobility within the same national 
jurisdiction during intermediary status prior to integration). 
5
See at: <http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/policy_and_research/un/58/ 
A_58_98_en.pdf>  
6
 See at:  <http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=3585_0_5_0>, 16 February 2010. This 
source indicates that the countries with the most international migrants are: US (43 million); 
Russia (12 million); Germany (11 million); Saudi Arabia, Canada, and France (about seven 
million each). Forty per cent of the total population of migrants are found in these six 
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contrast, refugees and internally displaced persons are primarily located in the 
developing world, reflecting pervasive conflicts in the development process. 
The UNHCR database shows that there were some 42 million forcibly 
displaced people worldwide at the end of 2008, including 15.2 million refugees, 
827,000 asylum-seekers (pending cases) and 26 million internally displaced 
persons. Developing countries are host to 80 per cent of the world’s refugees.7   
 Unlike cross-border movements of goods – which can be stored, 
destroyed or sold cheaply when in excess – the movements of people involve 
human lives, which are inevitably interwoven with each other in intricate ways. 
States’ handling of migrants affects both the individuals concerned and the lives 
of those connected to them, and therefore human rights and dignity have always 
been a primary issue. Beyond the questions of economic efficiency and 
effective border control, migration policy of all types has broader implications 
for social ethics and the morality of a given polity. 
 Attempts to make social ethics more prominent in international relations 
have brought the link between international migration and human security to 
the fore (Graham/Poku 2000; Truong 2006; Gasper/Truong 2010). The concept 
of human security entails that states are responsible not only for national 
security but also for protecting the basic rights of citizens and residents. The 
concept challenges the orthodox approach to international security that 
marginalizes concerns for security of the daily lives of ordinary people. The 
international security policy agenda has similarly tended to marginalize issues 
of human displacement and migration – both as a cause and a consequence of 
conflict (Newman/van Selm 2003; Fagan/Munck 2009). The concept of human 
security further seeks to address the connections of migration issues in a 
continuum of events, from conflict to failures both in development efforts and 
development-related global governance frameworks (Commission on Human 
Security 2003; Truong 2009a; 2010; Gasper 2010). The concept respects the 
personal dimensions of security, and factors of oppression and exploitation 
derived from the specific nature of migrants’ entry to circuits of cross-border 
movement. Migrants are often placed in a situation of liminality, suspended at a 
threshold, straddling between different administrative and juridical systems, 
cultures and identities. Apart from social and economic vulnerabilities, this 
situation generates new types of risks for migrants, owing to the perceptions 
held by society about the legitimacy of their presence and to a process of 
identity construction based on fear and distrust for the ‘Other’.  
 Since 9/11, the ‘War on Terror’ has re-asserted the orthodox approach 
to international security, thwarting the concept of human security. Security now 
acquires communitarian meanings (e.g., ‘homeland security’ in the U.S., or 
                                                                                                                                                   
countries. Oil exporter states in the Gulf of the Middle East have the highest shares of 
international migrants. In Qatar, more than 85 per cent of residents are migrants, and UAE 
and Kuwait have 70 per cent migrants. The countries with the lowest international migrant 
shares of residents include China, Indonesia, Vietnam, Peru and Cuba. There, less than one-
tenth of one per cent of current residents are international in-migrants.  
7
 See at: <http://www.unhcr.org/4a375c426.html> (30 March, 2010). Open conflicts in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo and Georgia have contributed to the 
growing number of refugees, though localized conflicts are also accountable. It is doubtful if 
UNHCR figures on internally displaced persons also cover those affected by large-scale 
development projects, such as the construction of dams and infrastructure. 
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‘societal security’, which involves the security of a collective identity, in the 
E.U.). Law and policy in many parts of the world today reflect the tendency to 
approach migration management in a narrowly instrumental way. Emphasis is 
placed on economic expediency, exclusionary communitarian principles, and 
technological fixes in surveillance aimed at discouraging particular types of 
migration.  
 The legal space around international migrants is hierarchical, 
conditioned by state preferences and admission policies that define the relation 
between the alien and the state in specific ways. Those in the lower strata are 
the least protected groups under international law. The race, class and gender 
effects of migration restrictions are visible through societal discourses 
characterized by polarizations between ‘cultural diversity’ versus 
‘homogeneity’, economic ‘gains’ versus ‘losses’, or ‘social cohesion’ versus 
‘disintegration’. These framings of ‘opportunity’ and ‘danger’ can translate into 
discriminatory practices that impose great financial, social and physical costs, 
especially upon the weakest groups. 
1.2.2 Migration and development: integrating 
perspectives from across a fragmented field  
Migration became a subject of scientific interest in the late 19
th
 century with the 
work of Ernest Georg Ravenstein, an English geographer of German origin who 
sought to demonstrate that migration occurs according to specific laws rather 
than erratically.
8
 In the last few decades, the subject has proliferated across 
many disciplines: economics, legal studies, sociology, anthropology, history, 
political science and international relations. Until recently, the field of study has 
largely concentrated on deepening some of Ravenstein’s ideas with the 
intention to provide answers to the following questions: Why do people 
migrate, through which pathways, how and with what consequences for sending 
and receiving areas? Traditional pursuits on the behaviour of migrants and 
states continue to dominate the field. Recently questions regarding cultural 
identities and associational life, assimilation and resistance have been added.  
 Massey and colleagues note that the field consists of “a fragmented set 
of theories that have developed largely in isolation from one another, 
sometimes but not always segmented by disciplinary boundaries” 
(Massey/Arango/Hugo/Kouaouci/Pellegrino/Taylor 1998: 17). Given that 
migration has accelerated in the last centuries, with distinct cycles correlated 
with changes in the world economy and transformations of polities, there is 
now consensus on the need to study this phenomenon as part of the globalizing 
processes driven by the emergence and growth of capitalist economies. Close 
reference to the perspectives of social ethics in migration, the meanings given 
                                                        
8
 Using census data from the United Kingdom, Ravenstein (1885 and 1889) developed his 
‘Laws of Migration’, which included, among others, 1) ‘push-pull’ process, or a gravitation 
from unfavourable conditions in one location  – such as oppressive laws, and heavy taxation 
– towards another location with more favourable conditions; 2) each main current of 
migration produces a compensating counter current; 3) the decrease in volume of migration 
as distance increases; 4) migration takes place in stages rather than one long move; 5) social 
differentials (e.g., gender, social class, age) influence a person's experience and pattern of 
mobility. 
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to ‘economic efficacy’, and the consequences for polities and cultural systems 
in the long term become vital.    
 The field is currently subdivided into different study areas. Forced 
migration covers displacement and cross-border refugees. International 
migration is sub-divided into different foci (labour, education, marriage 
formation, retirement, assimilation, ethnic relationships). It overlaps with 
transnational migration research that examines a variety of practices, including 
plural civic memberships, economic involvements, social networks and cultural 
identities linking people and institutions together across two or more nation-
states in diverse and multi-layered patterns (Lewitt/Schiller 2004).  
 An emerging area of research on transmigration examines the 
phenomenon of migrants-in-transit in one or more countries while on the way 
to their planned destination of settlement. Exploring the movements and 
adaptations of transiting groups (the routes chosen, the use of multiple locales, 
and the livelihoods they pursue), this area of research looks at ‘transitivity’ as a 
social condition within the continuum of a migratory trajectory. There are some 
important implications for understanding ‘temporality’, ‘permanence’, and the 
notion of country of origin and transit. The traditional understanding of 
migration trajectories based on a linear and bidirectional move – from a country 
of origin to a recipient country and return – no longer holds. Instead, multi-
directional patterns have emerged among those passing through one or more 
countries while on the way to their preferred destination. Their trajectories are 
not comparable to the conventional definition of international (or transnational 
migrants) who usually cross borders, settle in a recipient country and maintain 
ties with their home countries. Labour migrants can enter a recipient country 
legally, but may consider it an in-between station on the way to somewhere 
else, rather than a final destination.  
 In human trafficking, the term ‘transitivity’ is used to bring to light the 
complexity of this process, which may start in a different country than the 
country of origin, or occur in distinct phases. Diverse forms of transitivity have 
been found: people migrating legally from one country to another who find 
themselves at risk because of poverty, discrimination and marginalization and 
become trapped in a trafficking network; people trafficked from one country to 
another for a particular purpose who are later trafficked to a third country for a 
different purpose; and people trafficked internally, from a rural area to an urban 
area, who are later trafficked to another country for a different purpose 
(UNICEF 2003: 13). 
 Driven primarily by policy concerns, migration research has been 
influenced mainly by behaviourism, in varying forms and degrees. It draws 
largely from the body of thought of various orientations in the fields of 
neoclassical microeconomics and macro-sociology (Arango 2000). These 
traditions have only considered observable behaviour as relevant, and place 
issues of ‘mind’ or ‘consciousness’ in the subjective domain and outside the 
area of focus of objective social science.  
 Attempts to overcome the limits of the dominant frameworks in 
international migration studies have now produced a rich body of literature on 
transnational migration, most of it recent, concerned with migrants’ agency and 
the formation of their social identities. Scholars have borrowed insights from 
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recent social constructivist theories in international relations that analyse the 
relations between nation-states in light of the activities of transnational 
corporations and civil society organizations that pierce through borders. Such 
studies use the term ‘transnationalism’ to refer to the multifaceted and multi-
local processes of cross-border migration (Smith/Guarnizo 1998). The 
transnational approach aims to expose the deceptive binary constructs – such as 
national-international and local-global – found in dominant discourses on 
migration, and to reveal and explore the locations of transnational interactions, 
including villages and townships, borders and bureaucracies.  
 Built on an actor-oriented approach to study of the ‘missing middle’, or 
the meso level of interaction, this approach offers valuable alternative methods 
to analyse how rights, security and livelihoods are affected by migration, at 
multiple sites, thus uncovering the broader significance of ‘transnationalism’ 
for sending and receiving societies. Faist (2000) introduces the concept of 
‘transnational social spaces’ as virtual as well as real spaces, made up of 
practices adopted by migrants and stay-behinds, that connect both worlds as 
well as the activities of institutions such as nation-states that try to control these 
spaces. Activities in such spaces also influence the dynamics of mobility and 
immobility (e.g., providing resources and information for those wishing to 
move, and supporting the stay-behinds).  
 Migrants’ social identities, subject positions and agency are formed by a 
convergence of diverse social forces, which can involve complex intersections 
between different structures of social inequality (legal status, gender, class, age, 
race and sexuality) and social consciousness. Representation, boundary 
marking and the construction of social and political space in relation to 
migrants as subjects reflect this complexity and pose great challenges to 
deliberative democracy and access to rights. Far from being uniform, diverse 
power relationships control these transnational social spaces. For those who 
migrate through ‘irregular means’ today, information asymmetry and cognitive 
conflicts about the rights and obligations of the involved actors prevail. 
Information asymmetry can lead to unjust economic redistribution, and 
cognitive conflicts add to the denial of rights on grounds of ‘culture’.9  
 Today transnational migration often occurs in cross-cultural contexts, 
implying an encounter between different frames of reference about rights and 
obligations. Cognitive conflicts about rights and obligations that arise at 
different moments in the entire migration process (decision-making, during 
migration, job placement, return) typically leave those who are voiceless with 
no support, at best, and with fatal consequences at worst. The fluidity of 
migrants’ social identities may often obstruct the kind of consciousness 
required to overcome social divisions, and hence may undermine resistance to 
oppression, or may enhance competition where there are opportunities.  
 More analysis is required of the transnational social spaces through 
which migrants can assert their sense of being and belonging in order to claim 
                                                        
9
 For example domestic workers perform household tasks that historically have been assigned a 
diminished value due to the culture of gender, a problem further exacerbated by their 
association with particular groups (women, minorities, migrants). They are often forbidden 
from leaving the house. See at: <http://www.globalrights.org/site/DocServer/ 
Domestic_Workers_report-_FINAL.pdf?docID=5503> (25 February 2010). 
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rights. The nation-state, its polity, territorial and cultural boundaries pose 
significant barriers to the deliberative agency of footloose transnational 
migrants and transmigrants, with or without an approved formal legal identity. 
Thus, as useful as it is, the transnational migration paradigm must accord 
greater significance to structures of state, local configurations of administrative 
power, and the glaring imbalances in power relations between different 
transnational actors.  
 Recent studies of the migration industry as a loosely formed entity, 
comprised of private employment agencies, migrant networks and state 
agencies, have helped to reveal the working of social hierarchies within 
transnational spaces. Despite our having only fragmented knowledge that 
frequently lacks an evaluative and comparative dimension, existing studies 
show that practices of states and political norms do establish the conditions 
under which migration brokers can operate (Lucas 2004). Therefore, migration 
policy regimes and recruitment practices bear specific regional geopolitical and 
cultural features. Particular macro-economic and institutional linkages also play 
an important role in selectively channelling certain types of migrant labour to 
particular sectors within a country or region. These linkages also influence the 
behaviour of recruiting networks, which not only provide services passively but 
also actively mobilize labour and shape migrations.  
 The emerging architecture of the migration brokerage industry formed 
by interactions between different actors – the state through its administrative 
laws, service providers and migrants through market mechanisms – now 
involves a plethora of activities (recruitment, providing loans, arranging legal 
documents and travel, job placement and so forth) and operates across different 
national jurisdictions. In a neoliberal environment that advocates free 
movement of factors of production but imposes selective restrictions on the 
movement of people, the operation of this industry generates intermeshing 
practices that need to be scrutinized from a human rights perspective.
10
 Studies 
have shown a wide range of rights violations in the low-skill sectors; many of 
the violations are not formally recorded.  
 A widespread practice is to tie migrants to their employers or 
‘sponsors’, who withhold travel documents and identity papers, or impose 
excessive charges for food and accommodation, not only reducing migrants’ 
earnings but also preventing them from finding alternatives. Excessive fees 
charged upon arrival for non-transparent purposes, failure to fulfil placement 
obligations, contract substitution and disappearance of agents after collection of 
fees, have also been widely reported (Kuptsch 2006). Practices in the migration 
industry also contribute to the shaping of the conditions of migrants’ entry to 
the labour market indirectly, such as becoming ‘structurally embedded’ in 
‘temporary’ arrangements, meaning: circular labour migration on short-term 
visas without the possibility for extension (Tsuda 1999), and ‘Just-in-Time’ 
                                                        
10
 Goldstein (2006) describes the ‘sweating system’ or labour recruitment practices prevalent in 
the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries in low-skilled work, in which workers’ bargaining 
power was weakened and improvements in wages and working conditions suppressed. 
Today’s realities, he suggests, may well mean a return to this system, which is an outcome of 
the dysfunctionality of law and democratic deliberation at several levels.  
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labour delivery to support the ‘flexible staffing’ system adopted by employers 
to operate in highly fluctuating markets (Higuchi/Tanno 2003). 
  Maltreatment of migrant workers can lead receiving states to encourage 
direct recruitment, in order to eliminate brokers’ fees and malpractices. 
However, direct hiring has failed due to ‘kickback’ arrangements involving 
employers, brokers and state officials (Tierney 2007). Close cooperation 
between recruiters and state agents in sending countries can lead to the 
formation of an alliance of interests which can be detrimental to migrant 
workers’ rights (Wee/Sim 2004). The scope for justice-seeking actions in 
migration is often limited by the monopoly of the state over the means of 
movement, since this monopoly can be abused. Governments are the only 
actors who can provide legal papers, but government officials can collude with 
recruiters, by receiving ‘kickbacks’ to grant permissions without having 
checked the true nature of the work contract. These problems, reflecting 
information asymmetry between recruiting agents and the migrants, then spill 
over to the domains of work place entitlements and remittances.  
 The return to a systems approach in migration studies recognizes the 
mutual interplay between ‘structure’ and ‘agency’, and how migration systems 
evolve from interactions between regulation and the (potentially 
transformative) actions of those involved – the migrants, employers, social 
networks, civic organizations and law enforcement agents. REFERENCES? 
This work has contributed to new theoretical insights, which must be extended 
to the domain of intersecting inequalities that shape security-seeking actions of 
particular groups of migrants, and the challenges these may pose to justice-
seeking actions. 
Feminist scholarship on migration investigates the relationships 
between gender, worlds of work and culture. It has revealed the emotional and 
social as well as economic values of female niches of migration for work – such 
as domestic and care work, commercial sex work, or cross-cultural family 
formation (Truong 1996; Ehrenreich/Hochschild 2003; Palriwala/Uberoi 2008). 
The cultural representation of ‘women’ and ‘gender’ has become a site for 
competing understandings of many different migration-related controversies 
(such as prostitution and trafficking; migration for marriage formation through 
brokers; global care chains that outsource care, deficit and crisis). These 
analyses reveal rival ethical-political rationalities that establish the ‘objects’ of 
protection in opposed ways – in terms of asserted public morality and general 
societal wellbeing versus concern for specific categories of migrants.
11
 
Analyses of gender dynamics in the socio-cultural contexts of migration 
decisions further show how state ideology and policy shape the social 
environment in which networks operate and form their distinctive spatial 
arrangements and pathways of movements (Tyner 2000; Oishi 2005).  
                                                        
11
 For example, the focus on the care sector has exposed the chains of negative externalities by 
which an enhancement of care provision through labour import in some country can lead to 
the denial of the entitlement to care of others who stay behind (Parreñas 2001). In many 
countries this has led to a moral outcry about the care crisis that places the blame on women 
migrants (for neglecting their children and families) rather than examining state policy and 
the organization of care as a domain. See: Perera (2009) 
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 Feminist scholarship in migration studies has furthered our 
understanding by bringing to bear the significance of ‘gender’ and distinct 
epistemological and methodological values into research and interpretation. 
Besides gender-differentiated patterns of mobility, identified by Ravenstein 
more than 100 years ago, scholarship shows how gender moulds thinking, 
reasoning and understanding of human movements and the identities of those 
on the move. Now seen as a multifaceted process, transnational migration is 
analysed as something that profoundly influences a variety of domains in social 
lives – sexuality, gender, work, organization of caring practices, institutional 
life, as well as domination and resistance. In this respect, feminist scholarship 
has deepened the meaning of the term ‘feminization of migration’, far beyond 
just one of Ravenstein’s laws of migration.  
 Practices of control of migration in most countries today are born out of 
shifting modes of power, the declining commitment to welfare provision or 
assurance, and the ascendancy of a new logic dominated by public fiscal 
concerns. Today’s new forms of debt-financed migration12 undertaken by 
individuals for the sake of private household survival and growth are being 
stimulated by a migration industry that extends itself in the nebulous zone of 
services. The new forms reflect a complex web of inequalities co-constituted by 
neoliberal doctrines and pre-existing hierarchical relations between knowledge 
forms, people and their societies. Despite processes that enhance the 
interdependence between reproductive, productive and virtual economies and 
weave human lives together, people remain divided by unequal structural 
relations based on race, gender, class and nation (Peterson 2003). A cognitive 
frame that insists on sharply distinct social entities, rather than acknowledging 
their interconnectedness and interlocking nature, serves to reinforce these 
structures.  
1.3 Overview of the Chapters  
The book contains twenty two chapters, grouped in five parts.  
1.3.1 Part I: Introduction  
The two chapters in Part I address the main themes of the book. This 
introductory chapter presents the field of discussion and outlines the chapters. It 
is followed by a keynote chapter by Thanh-Dam Truong on “The 
Governmentality of Transnational Migration and Security: The Making of a 
New Sub-Altern”, which provides a historical and factual survey that sets the 
scene and an exposition of interpretive themes relevant to the whole book. By 
tracing the main lines in the framing of ‘security’, Truong identifies the 
historical junctions where its specific meanings have intersected with those of 
‘migration’ and ‘development’, involving the use of particular ethical norms 
and modes of conceptualization. A core issue today is the gradual practical and 
conceptual erosion of the legal boundaries set in the Westphalian framework of 
inter-state relations and the emergence of fragmented modes of regulation. By 
exploring the meanings of human mobility in the four extant frameworks of 
international legislation, Truong shows how the differentiation of meanings 
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 Debt-finance migration is characterized by the central role of intermediaries in financing the 
migration costs of resource-constrained migrants, who may enter servitude contracts on a 
temporary basis to pay back the debt before they can retain their full earnings. 
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reflects an ‘art’ of governing migration, which seeks to maintain a hierarchical 
global society supported by a logic of triage moulded by politics within nation-
states rather than to secure human rights in the migration process. She argues 
that this ‘art’ of governing has been bolstered by a neoliberal perspective on 
‘being human’, centred on a restricted notion of autonomy that contains a 
serious ontological and epistemological bias. It also carries important ethical 
implications because it promotes excessive individualism at the expense of 
relations of care and reciprocity in mutual recognition and respect. This 
perspective cannot be expected to deliver human security outcomes. The 
challenge ahead is for critical thought to engage with, and learn from, the 
experiences of insecurity endured by the new ‘subalterns’ – those who have no 
line of social mobility although their existence may involve a constant physical 
re-location. Learning from these experiences can help expose the currently 
fragmented vision of human movement across borders and the narrowly 
utilitarian logic that underpins it. Such an engagement, combined with learning 
from practices of reflexivity within and across cultures, can help to introduce an 
alternative conception of security-oriented collective agency by building on an 
ontology of care and deepening the notion of caring in social thought and 
action.  
1.3.2 Part II: Neoliberal governmentality and 
transnational migration: The interplay of business 
forces and security fears 
Governments frequently select migration policy positions which privilege 
security, trade and finance considerations over more people-centred concerns. 
The chapters in Part II show how giving priority to business concerns can lead 
to support for forms of migration considered ‘desirable’ and ‘profitable’ for 
business while retaining tight restrictions on those forms labelled as 
‘undesirable’ and ‘costly’ to the state. Mirroring the wider construction of a 
‘neoliberal subject’, migration management policy is biased towards the 
entrepreneurial aspects of ‘being’ and of ‘moving’. The chapters show the 
entrenched instrumental reasoning that sees people overwhelmingly as tools for 
economic gain rather than integrally as whole human beings. At the same time, 
a wish to keep out some of the types of migrant attracted by better economic 
prospects means that immigration and asylum issues often become framed as 
matters of ‘security’, a language that can override routine economic concerns. 
[this sentence is not clear to me.  
 Mexico is one of the top handful of countries as a source of emigrants 
and is a major transit country for aspirants from further south who seek to enter 
the United States or to return from there and travel home. Responding to 
demands for labour, and seeking to support or join their families, these 
travellers and work-seekers are often harassed, legally victimized and culturally 
denigrated within both Mexico and the U.S. Chapter 3 on “Human Insecurities 
and Migratory Policies for Migrants from Mexico and Central America to the 
United States”, by Gustavo Verduzco and María Isabel de Lozano, looks at the 
experiences of those who attempt to cross Mexico, both Mexican and non-
Mexican nationals. It draws on secondary data and a survey of migrants in two 
Mexican cities on the U.S. border and interviews with migrants, officials, 
priests and representatives of human rights groups. The chapter illustrates how, 
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located at the intersection of the two universes along the Mexico-U.S. border, 
the cities on the Mexican side have become extraordinary containers of mobile 
populations: those expelled from the U.S., those seeking to get in or get back in, 
and those returning home and becoming stranded.  
 The Mexican government has come under great pressure from the U.S. 
to seal both its northern and southern borders against migrants and drug 
smugglers. While on paper Mexico’s internal surveillance of migration has 
been relatively humane (protecting transit migrants from abuse, not treating 
them as criminals), policy practices have hardened in recent years. Intensive 
border patrols and increased roadside checks within Mexico have led to use of 
more dangerous routes, and to higher prices charged by person-smugglers 
(polleros), which suggests that it is the migration-facilitating networks who 
benefit most from the surveillance. Prices for crossing the northern border 
appear to have increased more than ten-fold in the last 15 years, from U.S. $250 
in 1994 to U.S. $3,000 by 2009. Large-scale movements across Mexico’s 
southern border involve third country nationals from Central America and 
elsewhere. Polleros now offer to take these transmigrants to U.S. territory for a 
price between U.S. $7,000 and $14,000 per person.
13
 A high proportion of 
transmigrants are subjected to abuse, including sexual abuse, both by officials, 
notably from the Mexican migration agency, and non-officials such as truck 
drivers. It is reported that some women, aware of the high probability of being 
raped, receive contraceptive injections prior to transit. Some polleros dupe 
migrants and channel them into sex-work, or kidnap them in order to demand a 
ransom from family members in the U.S. In turn, the U.S. border police avoid 
paperwork and expense, by placing all captured illegal migrants in one category 
and repatriating all to Mexico, including third country nationals, without the 
consent of the Mexican government. One result is homelessness among 
transmigrants. Many of those dumped in this fashion by the U.S. police are 
minors. Verduzco and Lozano underline the irony that in the land of 
opportunity and the market economy where many citizens wish to hire the 
services of these willing potential immigrant workers, the ‘huddled masses’ 
face such difficulties. They also show a further irony, for as migrants face 
greater difficulties now in crossing borders to revisit their country of origin, the 
motivation increases for dependants to permanently join wage-earners already 
in the U.S.  
 In chapter 4 on “The Blind Spot of Repression: Migration Policies and 
Human Survival in the Central Sahara”, Julien Brachet examines the growth of 
measures by European Union (E.U.) countries to block trans-Sahara and trans- 
Mediterranean migratory flows. Labour migration from the Sahel countries into 
North African countries includes long established migratory patterns connected 
with livelihood systems. Most of those involved in newer patterns of movement 
northwards in and across the Sahara also seek to go no further than the North 
African countries. However, fears of massive inflows of sub-Saharan migrants 
into Europe seem now to drive policy in E.U. states and they have taken what 
appear to be disproportionate actions, including several recent bilateral 
agreements with North African states to curb the flows. Libya – a country that 
seeks to re-establish its international respectability – agreed to increase border 
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 A return flight Phoenix-Cancun costs around U.S. $500 at current discount prices, showing 
the enormous financial burden of being without a valid travel document.  
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controls and to accept illegal migrants deported from Italy who had purportedly 
entered via Libya, in exchange for considerable development aid. Brachet finds 
that for the E.U. virtually all sub-Saharans travelling in the Sahara are now 
redefined as intercontinental economic migrants. The rhetoric of fear and 
control contributes to a misinterpretation of all trans-Saharan migration as 
trans-Mediterranean migration. No reliable precise figures exist, but based on 
several years of research in Niger – the country that provides the entire northern 
border of Nigeria, by far the most populous country in Africa – Brachet 
estimates that only 10 to 20 per cent of the migrants travelling to North Africa 
through Niger every year continue on to Europe, or between 5,000 and 20,000 
per year. The total numbers reaching Europe across the Sahara through Niger 
and its neighbours appear rather modest.  
 The new policies and practices in North and West African countries 
towards migrants, under pressure from the E.U., have doubtful impact in 
curbing the number of migrants reaching Europe, yet they carry broader 
consequences for the region. First, they disrupt patterns of movement within 
this region of Africa and endanger the livelihoods of large populations. Second, 
while increased controls along borders and roadsides and street-level checks do 
not effectively prevent movements, they drive them into more dangerous routes 
and channels; the greatest danger that those crossing from Niger to Algeria 
face, Brachet reports, is abandonment in the desert by their drivers. Third, 
detention and deportations of migrants into North Africa become increasingly 
frequent, often in deplorable conditions that trample basic principles of human 
rights whose defender the European Union claims to be. Brachet concludes that 
the new policies put ordinary inhabitants of the sub-Saharan region “under 
house arrest”, and contravene the guarantee in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights that everyone has the right to leave any country, including his 
own. 
 Chapter 5 on “Europeanization and the Right to Seek Refugee Status – 
Reflections on Frontex”, by Wies Maas and Thanh-Dam Truong, looks at E.U. 
border and asylum policies and practices. The effects of the abolition of internal 
borders through the implementation of the Schengen Agreement since 1995, 
amplified also by unanticipated external pressures, led to the creation of this 
agency in 2005 by the European Council of Ministers, with the aim of 
strengthening the E.U.’s external borders. Placed at the junction between 
migration and security politics, Frontex’s formation and trajectory reflect both 
the flaws in the process of European integration and the limited success in 
harmonizing asylum policy. These have produced a more restrictive 
interpretation of the right to seek asylum and a higher degree of control, 
without ensuring transparency and fairness. The result is that asylum seekers 
are now almost forced to enter illegally. The resulting netherworld of illegality 
will be considered further in the chapters by Skilbei and Tveit and by Hintjens, 
Kumar and Pouri. Now overseeing a hybrid policy system with blurred 
competences and various opt-outs, Frontex’s effectiveness requires public 
scrutiny. However, with the European Parliament only marginally involved and 
national parliaments of member states not being part of controlling Frontex 
operations, a ‘democratic deficit’ has arisen. Together with a surveillance 
approach that is obsessed with danger and crime, this all has dangerous 
implications for basic liberties within the E.U. itself.  
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 The sheer scale of Europe’s demographic imbalance — a fast aging 
population, and reproduction by the indigenous population at far below 
replacement levels — brings both strong demands for immigrant workforces 
and major resistance to them. In chapter 6 on “Fortress Europe and the Dutch 
Donjon: Securitization, Internal Migration Policy and Irregular Migrants’ 
Counter Moves”, Godfried Engersen and Dennis Broeders discuss the measures 
in the EU to identify and penalize those migrants who still gain unauthorized 
entry, with special reference to the Netherlands, one of the countries where 
resistance to immigrants has become intense. They present in particular the 
measures to prevent unauthorized (‘irregular’) migrants from having access to 
formal employment and social services, and evidence on the various intended 
and unintended effects.  
Recognizing that the Union’s external borders are inevitably somewhat 
porous, E.U. leaders and officials have instituted an array of internal ‘gates’ by 
which to capture irregular migrants or exclude them from important goods. The 
Netherlands is at the forefront here. First, there is identity control: to prevent 
irregulars from acquiring the documents required to access vital goods; and to 
acquire information on excluded individuals in order to identify and continue to 
exclude them, including expel them after due legal process. Identity control 
measures include database projects at the E.U. level, including for biometric 
data. People unable to provide legally satisfactory documents are held in a 
greatly expanded system of detention centres while they are investigated prior 
to possible expulsion. ‘Irregulars’ sometimes resist by destroying their original 
legal identity markers — individuals with no confirmed legal identity are 
difficult to expel, since other countries are unwilling to accept them — and/or 
by acquiring new ones. Inevitably, the situation has generated a market in 
‘legal’ identities. Second, there are increased inspections and penalties imposed 
on employers of irregular migrants, although various adaptive responses exist 
for employers and migrants, including use of subcontractors and intermediary 
recruitment agencies who are skilled in operating the system. Proportionately 
speaking, irregular migrants are being driven out of formal sector work into 
informal employment, as in hotels and restaurants, and more than before into 
criminal activities. The mega database projects have a similar perverse effect: 
the more that those who have overstayed — after an original legal entry on a 
visitor’s visa or as an asylum applicant — become at risk of detection, the more 
that latecomers instead enter illegally via smuggling organizations. 
 The next step in the migration control chain, after seeking to block and 
discourage entry, and to detect, discourage and expel illegal migrants, is to 
encourage return to the country of origin and to reduce the pressures for others 
to come. The expectation among Northern policymakers has been that 
economic development in sender countries will reduce migrant outflow. 
Various studies suggest instead that economic development increases the ability 
to move and perhaps also the aspiration to move; and further it increases the 
need to move in the case of people who are physically displaced by new 
infrastructure or economically displaced by restructuring. 
 Chapter 7 by Alejandra Boni and Joan Lacomba on “The New Co-
Development Agenda: Official and Non-Official Initiatives between Morocco 
and Spain” looks at how the idea of ‘co-development’ emerged in negotiations 
between the European Union and especially its immediate southern neighbours 
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during the 1990’s, and how it has grown since then. They show how advocates 
of co-development in Europe express the need to consider a migrant population 
as a vector or agent of development between its ‘host’ country and its ‘sending’ 
country, establishing a central role to be played by migrants by becoming a 
development link on both sides. Yet E.U. policy on co-development has in 
practice been subordinate to measures of direct migration control and 
prevention. The authors observe that the reference to positive links between 
migration and development is absent at the level of the relationship between the 
E.U. and Morocco, where a view of migration centred on illegal immigration 
and migratory flow control prevails. Similarly, Spain’s migration policies 
perceive co-development as linked to economic development in the countries of 
origin and to the return of migrants. Yet Spain’s multi-level polity allows for 
independent initiatives from Autonomous Communities, as well as from NGOs 
and migrant groups, and these agents have been more flexible and imaginative 
than Madrid. Referring to Ramón (2005: 51), Boni and Lacomba emphasize 
that the agents of co-development are not just governments in their bilateral 
relationships, but primarily migrants themselves and secondarily the social 
agents of both societies (labour unions, companies, teaching institutions, citizen 
organizations, NGOs). A large gap typically exists between migrant 
associations and official co-development programmes: the former lack 
recognition and resources and distrust the very term ‘co-development’ as 
officially used, owing to its strong connotations of migration control and 
encouragement to return. Official co-development policies, Boni and Lacomba 
reveal, are characterized by a remarkable distance between discussions and 
actions, and between the statements that present migrations as positive for 
development and the attempts to prevent them. A less contradictory and better 
scientifically grounded conception of co-development, they suggest, may be 
found in Malgesini (2007: 31) who defines it “as the set of positive effects of 
immigration for the development of the origin and hosting society generated by 
the contact and exchange between people from different backgrounds”. 
 The major recent focus of attention regarding relations between 
international migration and economic development has been the rapidly 
increasing and impressive volume of migrants’ financial remittances to low- 
and middle-income countries of origin. This has been matched by ambitious 
schemes to facilitate, channel and regulate the remittances through formal 
banking channels. At present half or more of remittances are still handled 
through informal providers, who offer a flexible, non-bureaucratic, door-to-
door service, which is also anonymous, a vital consideration for migrants with 
irregular legal status. Chapter 8 on “The Rise of Migrants’ Remittance 
Institutions: Driven by Supply or Demand?” by Amrita Sharma and Karim 
Knio, examines the motives involved in creating a new ‘financial architecture’, 
with attention to the cases of India, Indonesia and the Philippines. Financial 
sector agencies have become keen to control what are seen as substantial and 
fast growing money flows, and to weave around them new financial products 
that can be traded, as part of the realms of speculation that eventually crashed in 
2008-2009. In addition, some governments of migrant sending countries have 
been keen to compensate for actual or expected declines or fluctuations in 
foreign aid or foreign private investment; and governments of many countries 
have feared that informal remittance channels are or can be used to fund 
terrorist organizations. Reviewing the evidence, the authors suggest that the 
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current drive to formalize remittance channels, and the mechanisms thus set up, 
come more from commercial interest than from concerns for migrants’ 
wellbeing. Financial system regulators should seek to understand and serve 
migrants’ needs rather than to drive their monies into the circuits of speculative 
financial capitalism.   
 Spanning all these concerns — recruitment, legal and illegal; prevention 
and repatriation; remittances and other lines for ‘co-development’ — stands the 
largest specialist organization in the field: the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM), an intergovernmental giant with more than 7,000 employees. 
Originally the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, it 
continues to be dominated in funding and orientation by its high-income 
member states. It produces the largest periodic survey, the World Migration 
Report, a series that started appearing from 2000 as high-income countries 
began to realize that a stance of exclude-and-restrict, while domestically 
politically popular, could not meet their economic and social demands. 
Elaboration of the ‘migration management’ agenda has involved two broad 
thrusts. First, arguments to persuade low-income country governments that 
while high control and selectivity with respect to migration into high-income 
countries would prevail, there would be large potential profit from cooperation 
with the governments of these countries to prepare and supply various 
categories of skilled and semi-skilled labour, typically through temporary but 
often recurrent migration. Second, work to quietly persuade the populations of 
high-income countries that continuing inflows on a large-scale are unavoidable 
and that it is better to handle these through legally controlled channels. In 
effect, the model low-income country becomes the Philippines. Since the 
1970’s this country has done as recommended above and built an enormous 
bureaucracy that helps place Filipino workers in high-income countries around 
the world. More than ten per cent of its population are at any given moment 
abroad, sending remittances that comprise around ten per cent of GDP, 
although, as many scholars judge, with little long-term benefit for its economy, 
society or polity: remittances have become a substitute for internal reform. 
 Chapter 9 on “Managing Migration in the IOM’s World Migration 
Report 2008”, by Beatriz Campillo Carrete and Des Gasper, looks at the most 
recent of the World Migration Reports. The chapter illustrates the use of 
methods of discourse analysis to identify the principles of selection, 
interpretation, prioritization and argumentation that structure such a report. It 
gives particular attention to the choices and use of key terms, like ‘mobility’, 
‘needs’ and ‘globalization’, and of key metaphors that guide the discussion, 
notably the metaphor of ‘flows’. Dominated by the mental models of 
neoclassical and neoliberal economics and the policy preoccupations of high-
income countries, the central policy claims in the Report concern the ‘need’ for 
international cooperation to match labour demand and supply within a global 
framework (as a concomitant of economic globalization in other respects), and 
that such cooperation will support economic development worldwide. It 
proposes in great detail methods for managed labour migration. A human rights 
stance makes occasional appearances, represented by uses of the term ‘human 
mobility’ rather than ‘labour mobility’ or ‘mobility for economic purposes’, but 
it remains firmly subordinated to economic priorities based on market power. 
Migrants’ opinions and agency receive little attention. Even so, the World 
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Migration Report 2008 represents efforts towards a more open global economic 
order and an attempt to shift from an agenda overwhelmingly focused on 
restriction, by building public acceptance of substantial immigration to match 
labour demand. Low-skilled migrants, however, will remain largely excluded 
formally, since the informal supply of such migrants is expected to be ample, 
and formal exclusion helps to keep their labour low-cost.  
1.3.3 Part III: Migration as life experiences: Agency in 
the grey zone  
The chapters in Part II were largely discussions at the macro-level, examining 
also the perspectives of officials in governmental or intergovernmental 
organizations or associations of employers or bankers, with only occasional 
references to the life experiences of individuals who seek a livelihood or family 
reunion through migration. In contrast, the focus in Part III is on migration as 
life experiences, to consider the unintended or intended effects of the migration 
management regimes which combine formal restriction and controlled entry 
with large-scale informal reliance on immigrant labour. Policies shaped by 
global market expansion under a cloud of security fears create ‘grey zones’ for 
specific groups of migrants, with little concern for their welfare. The panoply of 
legal controls creates a series of ambiguous spaces in interpreting and applying 
the laws, in balancing the wishes of employers and potential employees against 
the fears and objections of others, and in living outside the law. Part III 
examines the effects and side effects, the resulting lived experiences, in a series 
of locales: foreign women working as street prostitutes in Norway; young 
women in South East Asia on the move in order to seek work; youth moving 
likewise between European countries; and students from low-income countries 
who combine studies in Australia with paid work while also aiming for longer-
term residence. The essays show how migrants negotiate their way in pursuit of 
economic and personal goals while facing the risk of falling into exploitative 
traps, and the importance for policy formulation of taking cognisance of this 
insiders’ knowledge and experience.  
 The population of women in street prostitution in Norway rapidly 
transformed in just a few years, from 2003 to 2008, to become predominantly 
composed of women from Nigeria. A high proportion of these have been 
trafficked — brought in illegally and with elements of deception or even duress 
by organizations that typically continue to control and to some degree exploit 
them. Chapter 10 on “Mission Impossible? Voluntary and Dignified 
Repatriation of Nigerian Victims of Trafficking”, by May-Len Skilbrei and 
Marianne Tveit, builds on interviews with 150 Nigerian women in street 
prostitution, representing one-third of that group in Norway in 2006, to cast 
light on the possibilities for repatriation of identified victims of trafficking who 
request assistance. Driven by poverty and deteriorating family circumstances, 
and in consultation with their families in Nigeria, these women sought entry 
into Europe to earn and send money back home. To gain entry they used the 
services of smugglers, for amounts between US $13,000 and $80,000, often 
closer to the higher figure, leaving themselves with large debts in addition to 
their targets for earning in order to save and remit. In many cases deception was 
involved: women were promised a job and residence permit, but subsequently 
received no such document and were forced into commercial sex work. Most of 
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the interviewed women had spent some years already in other European 
countries before beginning to work in Norway, and often were not permanently 
resident there but flew in periodically, to take advantage of the higher prices 
paid for sexual services. Uninterested in the option of assisted return made 
available by the Norwegian government, most interviewed women felt strong 
needs to make something out of their huge investments of money and personal 
suffering, rather than return ‘home’ merely older, empty-handed and 
humiliated. Many also indicated fear of punishment by their pimp or madam if 
they return to Nigeria, as well as dissatisfaction at the male dominance and 
relative frequency of violence there. Fear of arrest and detention upon return—
the alternative being to bribe the responsible state officials—was also prevalent. 
Returning home in such circumstances would make sex work in some other part 
of Nigeria the only viable ‘home’ option for many of them; taking up new debts 
and re-entering the stream of trafficked and smuggled persons returning to 
Europe was a more likely outcome.  
 The Norwegian-Nigerian case study shows limitations of the 
assumption that victims of trafficking want, or will benefit from, repatriation. 
Chapter 11 on “Migrant Women and Their Vulnerability in the Trafficking-
Migration Continuum: Evidence from Asia”, by Yu Kojima, shows how a 
policy approach built on a dichotomous contrast between human trafficking and 
legal routes of migration is misguided. She examines the full spectrum of the 
migration process of female migrant workers in some parts of Asia who are 
involved in private care and commercial sexual services. Many are drawn into 
illegal work after an initial period in legal activity. From the experiences of 
these young women, Kojima shows how the scope of present legal measures 
does not fully reflect the complex process and context of migration in which 
these women are involved. Kojima argues for greater attention to the various 
intersecting aspects of inequality and vulnerability. Understanding the intricate 
and dynamic nature of the material and subjective conditions associated with 
the migration-trafficking continuum and the importance of the intersecting 
processes of discrimination against migrant women and youth could 
significantly improve policy and human rights protection. 
 Chapter 12 on “The EU’s Ambiguous Position on Underage Migrant 
Workers”, by Roy Huijsmans, examines the European Union’s possible 
circumvention of human rights policy on children by adoption of the conceptual 
category of ‘youth’. Huijsmans explores the (in)compatibility of the dominant 
concept of children (those under the age of 18, according to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child) and the phenomenon of adolescent migrant workers 
(between the ages of 15 and 18) within the E.U., for example under the ‘Youth 
in Action’ programme that promotes inter-E.U. cultural exchange and labour 
movement. Besides, among young people who move for purposes of work, a 
majority combine study, ‘volunteering’, ‘traineeships’ and ‘exchanges’ with 
paid work. The 1994 E.U. Directive on the Protection of Young People at Work 
in fact allows that children be employed from the age of 13, if it will not be 
“detrimental to regular school attendance or prevent children benefitting fully 
from their education”.14 Full-time work by 13 and 14 year olds during school 
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vacations and by 15-17 year olds throughout the year and in any part of the 
E.U. appears permitted. Seeing the positive in the possibilities opened up for 
children to express agency and independence, Huijsmans examines also the 
risks to children’s rights. The introduction of the term ‘youth’ (understood as 
from 13 to 30 by the ‘Youth in Action’ programme) may be seen as an attempt 
by the EU to free itself from some of the constraints set by the rights-based and 
human trafficking discourses. Huijsmans considers the data on migrant teenage 
workers, and notes the risks that the introduction of the ‘youth’ terminology 
within the EU entails, including for temporary seasonal work under harsh 
conditions and possibly even for trafficking into sex work. He concludes 
however that adolescents of 15, 16 and 17 are not infants. The chances that they 
make high-risk choices are no greater than those for adults in comparable 
situations. While some migrants classified under the category of ‘youth’ may 
become subject to abusive practices, the alternative should not be to condemn 
their migration for work but to find a framework for safe migration. Overall, he 
suggests that, by endorsing migrant work under the age of 18 but making it 
subject to labour law at the national level, the E.U. provisions for free 
movement of workers can make involvement by minors in migrant work safer, 
targeting exploitation and abuse rather than migration itself. 
 The following essay (chapter 13) on “Learning how to Work the Grey 
Zone: Issues of Legality and Illegality among Indian Students in Melbourne, 
Australia”, by Michiel Baas, takes us from teenage workers to international 
university students who also become involved in paid work. Baas examines the 
aggressively marketed tertiary education industry in Australia, which plays a 
significant role in facilitating the entry of migrants. Indeed chapter 4 of the 
2008 World Migration Report is devoted to this type of migration. In 2006, 
almost two per cent of Australia’s population consisted of foreign students, and 
there are now close to 100,000 students from India alone. Many of the Indian 
students whom Baas interviewed spoke of a problematic quality of education 
and of current poor conditions of living and working, but said that they planned 
to apply for permanent residence. Many had this intention in advance of 
applying for a study programme. Almost half of foreign students come through 
private agencies, which channel them to particular educational institutions from 
which the agencies receive a commission, and to particular courses that favour 
the students’ qualification for permanent residence. To obtain this qualification 
and pay off educational debts, they work long hours in paid employment 
alongside their studies — often beyond the legally permitted 20 hours per week 
and with ‘cash-in-hand’ payment to avoid any paper trail. Baas indicates that 
the motivation of Indians to study in Australia has increasingly become to 
acquire residence rights. An ‘Overseas Students Act’ and an associated 
‘National Code’ in Australia regulate the international marketing of educational 
services. Recruitment with a primary purpose to provide an immigration route 
is prohibited, but many tertiary education organizations and immigration 
businesses are critically dependent on income from foreign students. At the 
same time, economic analysis is insufficient, at least for the side of the 
prospective migrants. It cannot explain why still relatively so few people try to 
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migrate, and why emigrants are concentrated among particular social groups 
and localities. So Baas explores also the imaginative dimension of transnational 
migration: how large numbers of middle class young Indians have become able 
to not just imagine but also act on a vision of an alternative life based far away 
in Australia. The gains reaped by the providers have led the Australian state and 
universities to ignore the grey zone that has emerged, and the lifestyles 
envisaged by the students inure them to endure it.  
1.3.4 Part IV: Transnational identities and issues of 
citizenship  
The meanings ascribed to citizenship are under intense pressure from 
globalization. Migration in particular leads to the reconstruction of social 
identities and worldviews, for both migrants and non-migrants. The chapters in 
Part IV illustrate how identities, belongingness and relationships are re-
positioned by the effects of globalization, the political and policy environments 
and the predominance of market imperatives. Several chapters examine 
migrants’ transnational identities and multi-local politics, to explain tensions 
and dilemmas arising around state obligations to citizens and migrants. They 
attend to the life realities of the subjects themselves – whether migrants, 
‘indigenous’ citizens, or state-less nationals. They imply the need to re-
conceptualize citizenship and re-cast state obligations in ways that are more 
ethically inclusive and appropriate for societies that are increasingly 
heterogeneous and multicultural — themes that will be taken further in Part V. 
Chapter 14 on “Gender, Technology and Migration in Export-
Production of Shrimps: Identity Formation and Labour Practices in Surat Thani 
Province, Thailand”, by Bernadette P. Resurreccion and Edsel E. Sajor, 
illuminates how migrants seek to make sense of and in their lives, in their 
specific geographical, social and legal setting. Their identities are formed and 
re-formed in daily interactions and discourses in their work ‘habitus’. In 
particular, the identity-markers of ‘gender’,  ‘migrant’ and ‘worker’ interact to 
produce specific labour control practices affecting wage levels and migrant 
workers’ wellbeing. The chapter draws from research on the use of migrant 
labour from Northeast Thailand, Laos and Myanmar in the production for 
export of genetically engineered shrimp in Southern Thailand. Whereas large-
scale enterprises employ Thai migrant workers coming from the North, medium 
and small farms employ mainly migrant husband-wife couples from 
neighbouring countries. Migrant couples are often together with their pre-
school children but the school age children have to be sent to the home area. 
Owners consider couples more reliable and more productive: the wife is 
available to support in the round-the-clock tasks of shrimp farming as well as to 
keep the male worker stable and responsible. The couples are usually paid a 
‘family wage’ far less than a double wage; typically the wife is not classified as 
a ‘real’ worker. The family wage system is applied much less to Thai workers. 
Most Thai female workers receive a separate wage, and although they too fulfil 
supplementary and lower status roles, they are able to engage in additional 
income generating activities locally in combination with childcare. Burmese 
workers in particular have much less latitude to engage in supplementary paid 
work, though their ‘wife’ role is comparable to their Thai counterparts. 
Resurreccion and Sajor show how a particular set of life-world niches has 
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emerged around shrimp farming, and how, through migration, different gender 
and ethnic identities are formed and solidified, partly according to the scale of 
production, and how they sustain different systems of rights and entitlements. 
 Chapter 15 on “Changing Identities, Multi-local Politics and 
Citizenship: Reflections on the Agency of Migrants from Indonesia and their 
Descendants in the Netherlands”, by Ton van Naerssen, looks at the dialectics 
of migrant identity formation and transnational practices among people from 
the former Dutch East Indies who moved to the Netherlands, concentrating on 
the two largest groups: the Nederlands-Indisch (mixed-race ‘Dutch-
Indonesians’ or in this chapter, ‘Indisch-Dutch’) and the Moluccans (from what 
are now two provinces in the east of Indonesia). The case has particular interest 
since it extends over several generations, has been much studied, shows both 
continuing evolution of identities and continuing distinctive group identities, 
and provides a sharp contrast between these two groups. The differences are 
understood within a transnational perspective, including reference to factors in 
both the host country and the migrant-sending country as well as to their mutual 
relations. For example, Moluccan identity and citizenship in the Netherlands 
have critically depended on the Moluccan struggle for independence from 
Indonesia. Historically classified as temporary residents in the Netherlands by 
the Dutch state, the Moluccans’ failure to realize an independent Moluccan 
Republic pushed them into a grey zone owing to their inability to identify as 
either ‘Dutch’ or ‘Indonesian’. The chapter asks how this identification may 
change if and as meanings ascribed to citizenship undergo fundamental 
changes. Second, van Naerssen explores how the increasing economic linkages 
between Indonesia and the Netherlands in the various strands of the ‘migration-
development nexus’ are at the same time a cultural space which provides new 
dimensions to the identities of some of the migrants and their families, and to 
the meaning of their citizenship. For both groups, the Moluccans and the 
Indisch-Dutch, ties to Indonesia seem not to wither over time: instead, the 
number of transnational community organizations grows. The chapter casts 
implicit light at the same time on the ‘host’ community of white Dutch and on 
their Netherlands-specific official concept of allochtoon, whereby the 
grandchildren and great-grandchildren of immigrants sixty years ago from ‘the 
Indies’ remain conceptually separated from the white Dutch, whether or not 
they are Dutch citizens and regardless of how they identify themselves.  
 Chapter 16 on “Pro-asylum Advocacy in the EU: Challenging the ‘State 
of Exception’”, by Helen Hintjens, Richa Kumar and Ahmed Pouri, looks at the 
motivations and practices of activists and advocates who seek to protect the 
rights of asylum seekers and refugees in Western Europe. It looks in particular 
at the felt identities of the activists, and how these are affected by their 
resistance to the ‘3-Ds’ that have become central instruments in E.U. policy 
towards asylum seekers—destitution, detention and deportation. As seen earlier 
in Maas and Truong’s chapter on Frontex, people claiming asylum in the 
European Union are now virtually forced to enter illegally. If they reach Europe 
they face the battery of deterrence policies illustrated in the chapter by 
Engbersen and Broeders, that seek to exclude asylum seekers from all access to 
a legal existence and thus to dissuade them through destitution. Hintjens, 
Kumar and Pouri describe not only the policies but also the practices of how 
asylum-seekers’ rights are routinely suspended by officialdom and decision-
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makers whenever they see fit, within the ‘state of exception’ that now operates 
across the E.U. Detention camps, often run by private companies, are operated 
as instruments of deterrence. Similarly, the lessons learned by destitute asylum 
seekers are intended for a wider audience of transmigrants or potential asylum 
seekers as well; and private companies and corporatized public agencies have 
quotas and targets for deportations.  
 In the context of the felt threat of ‘terrorism’, the rise of a ‘surveillance 
state’, and the progressive erosion of the rights of asylum seekers, those who 
seek to assist or defend them are themselves increasingly liable to surveillance 
and harassment. What motivates them to enter and persist in such work? The 
cases from the Netherlands and UK presented by Hintjens, Kumar and Pouri 
show people who stumbled by chance onto the harsh realities of current-day 
practice of the 3-Ds in the E.U. The experiences of the activists, including of 
these authors, lead them to reflect on the nature of the world system and the 
possible parallels now at a global level to the elaborate system of privilege, 
exclusions and deportations that was practiced in apartheid-era South Africa. 
Advocates across Europe converge on a perception of the 3-Ds as part of a 
system of global injustice.  
 Chapter 17 on “Human or Public? The Referents of Security in 
Discourses on Migrants in Japan”, by Tatsuo Harada (with Kenji Kimura), 
highlights that Japanese government policy documents on development 
cooperation and international relations use the discourse of ‘human security’ to 
stress the security of the individual human being, worldwide. In stark contrast, 
much internal discourse about those ‘distant others’ who have arrived as labour 
migrants in Japan identifies them as threats to ‘public security’ whose 
‘dangerous’ character justifies their exclusion from mainstream society. They 
are excluded even from the public education system. The ‘human’ seen at a 
distance becomes the dangerous ‘other’ when viewed at close quarters in the 
homeland. Strikingly, this exclusion, which relates in part to the Japanese self-
image of being ethnically homogeneous, has occurred also for groups who had 
been identified as preferred immigrants after Japan’s domestic ‘reserve armies’ 
of rural labour and women were exhausted: the Nikkeijin, the ethnic Japanese 
from Brazil and Peru, whose entry was permitted by the immigration law of 
1990 based on jus sanguinis. Understanding of the real and felt insecurities of 
people in Japan, both migrants and indigenes, becomes an essential but 
neglected task for the voluminous Japanese work on ‘human security’.  
The chapter takes up this challenge with special reference to the Chubu 
region, one of Japan’s manufacturing heartlands, to which many Nikkeijin 
workers were drawn. It looks first at Brazilian Nikkeijins. Their children speak 
Portuguese at home and often cannot cope in Japanese schools; those rejected 
by the school system have no access to other state-supported education (indeed 
foreigners in Japan have no legal right to education at all) and become adrift, 
rendering them almost unemployable except in illicit activities. Second, the 
chapter summarizes research on overstayers from South Asia who work in 
factories under exploitative terms. Rather than requesting approval to hire 
foreigners, the factories prefer to use ‘illegals’, who can be paid less, lack 
medical care rights, and can be easily dismissed. Given trends that undermine 
local communities, such as local government expenditure cuts and closure of 
local hospitals and small shops, the immigrants become targets of reactions that 
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express locally felt insecurity. Harada advises that responding to these negative 
cycles of social exclusion requires that domestic policymakers absorb the 
principle of pervasive interconnection that has justified adoption of a ‘human 
security’ perspective in international relations. 
 The themes of mutual interconnection, inclusion and mutual benefit, 
and preservation or building of community all appear again but in special forms 
in the final chapter in Part IV, “The Global Forum on Migration and 
Development: ‘All Talk and No Action’ or ‘A Chance to Frame the Issues in a 
Way that Allows You to Move Forward Together?’”, by Bernice Roldan and 
Des Gasper. It explores the proposed rationale of the Global Forum launched by 
Kofi Annan in 2006 as UN Secretary General, as an informal inter-
governmental discussion space rather than as part of the UN system. The first 
part analyses Annan’s advocacy of the Forum, through close textual analysis of 
his speech to the High-Level Dialogue that he convened in New York. His 
position involved a series of claims: 1) migration must be managed; 2) to 
proceed from the present entrenched disagreements and mistrust requires 
constructive structured communication; 3) the Global Forum can provide this 
and is a feasible way forward, unlike proposals for binding international 
conventions; 4) through processes of growing mutual education and mutual 
acceptance the Forum can be fruitful. Annan’s hypotheses could appear to be 
rather optimistic when the implied notions of building trust and community 
(amongst those referred to in the chapter as ‘migro-crats’, the managers and 
policymakers in the global networks of migration) are unpacked, and the 
validity of the assumptions (about how regular channels and fora of systematic 
but relatively informal communication can affect attitudes and in turn affect 
choices) is tested.  
The second part of the chapter monitors how these hypotheses had fared 
by the time of the second GFMD conference, held in Manila in 2008, using 
other methods of discourse analysis to dissect its concluding report. The Manila 
meeting’s declaration of a ‘focus on the person’ appeared in reality to mean a 
focus on the ‘migro-crats’ and their interactive processes of mutual education 
and teambuilding aimed at producing practical cooperation. The report is 
relatively silent on migrants themselves, but claims that the Forum process is 
“changing the way the world looks at migration and development” and, “more 
importantly…changing the way we deal with each other on [migration and 
development]” (paragraphs 2 and 3 of the conference’s final report: Conejos 
2008). To clarify this whole strategy and draw out its mindset and assumptions, 
the chapter presents a series of accessible tools of discourse analysis that may 
be more widely useful in migration studies and for participation in migration 
policy debate.  
1.3.5 Part V: Ethics of modern-day transnational 
migration: A human security perspective  
Transnationalism involves the intensive routine interconnection of what were 
previously largely separate national spaces. We see diverse competing global 
projects that seek to order this emergent global space. One project envisions a 
world of separate national homes; here international migrants are felt as a 
troublesome complication, useful but also a threat. Second is the project of the 
global market, in which migrants are considered as a mobile factor of 
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production with few rights. Thirdly we have the vision of a world of 
international human rights in which migrants share and belong, and which 
includes instituted accountability for protecting their rights and wellbeing.  The 
final section of this volume consolidates a framework for description, 
explanation, evaluation and response: a version of human security thinking that 
provides a critique and alternative to predominant forms of liberal and 
neoliberal thought and seeks to adequately ground human rights thinking. Intra-
nationally, we must move beyond a Rawlsian liberal justice framework and 
conception of a social contract, which continues to conceive of people only as 
autonomous legal units. Focus only on the individuality of people narrows 
down the potential for fellowship with others. Internationally, a human security 
framework goes beyond the Westphalian conception of states and citizenship 
and responds to a transnational and interpenetrated system. It offers a suitably 
pluralist approach, setting universal human rights thinking within humanly 
richer and more conflict-aware perspectives.  
 Chapter 19 on “International Migration, Well-being and Transnational 
Ethics”, by Des Gasper, gives a perspective for considering the well-being of 
migrants, of people in the ‘sender’ society, and people in the ‘receiver’ society, 
integrating human rights thinking with care ethics and sensitivity to 
subjectivities. Active respect for each person worldwide relies on some 
informed awareness of the contents of their lives. In reaction to much 
philosophical literature in international relations, the chapter seeks a better 
empirical grounding for the stage of philosophical argument. Starting by 
looking at the contents of migrant lives, it moves to consider their evaluation, in 
terms of well- and ill-being and the justice and injustice of their generation and 
distribution, including reference to criteria of fair process, desert and fair 
opportunity. The relevant empirical background includes awareness of the 
historical record of dispossession, domination and discrimination over the past 
five centuries. Linking to the chapters in Part IV, Gasper notes how migration 
jumbles up the contents of the national ‘societies’ that are assumed to be 
discrete units by ‘realist’ international relations and nationalist ethics theorists. 
Migration creates new liminal zones and increases the plurality within identity, 
building a world system of a myriad of overlapping communities, not of self-
contained nation-states. These more complex liminal identities can help to 
counter the ‘othering’ processes that often render identities crude and mutually 
antagonistic. Nevertheless, any rethinking of the contents of the ‘self’ and of 
one’s ‘interests’ is a long-term process that may depend on a prior phase of 
respectful coexistence motivated by enlightened self-interest. Human security 
thinking thus centrally emphasizes the theme of ‘common security’: that in an 
interconnected world to disrespect the security of others will undermine your 
own security. Cooperative coexistence motivated by awareness of 
interdependence can gradually foster acceptance of plurality among and within 
identities, and of sharing across identities, and the perception that one’s identity 
can be enriched rather than threatened by that of others. 
 Chapter 20 on “Migration, Morality and Finance”, by Amiya Kumar 
Bagchi, investigates further the assumptions used in philosophical discussions 
of the ethics of migration. Bagchi challenges the lack of attention to macro-
structures and systems that reproduce and exacerbate inequality and poverty, 
including the financial and trade structures that contribute strongly to injustice 
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in most societies, and the assumption that dramatic socio-economic inequality 
is inevitable. He posits that the root causes of streams of ‘illegal’ migrants are 
gross international inequality and poverty. Here he removes the ‘veil of 
ignorance’ placed over the historical record, and posits several recent major 
shifts that have in his view aggravated international inequality and fed pressures 
to emigrate: the movement since the 1970s against granting predominant roles 
to the state in developing countries in long-term economic development 
strategy and in provision of social services; the transfer instead of sovereign 
authority to financial markets; and the decline and fall of the Soviet bloc. The 
nature and widespread failure of the associated economic structural adjustment 
programmes implemented in the 1980s and 90s fed new waves of migration. So 
too has unlimited and unregulated capital mobility across international borders, 
including the acceptance of funds by many international banks without asking 
any questions, which permits continuous capital flight from poor economies. 
Yet the countries that receive these funds impose the strictest restrictions on 
inflows of labour. Bagchi suggests that the required reforms must start from 
principles of universal human rights. They should include regulation of the 
export and import of capital in all countries, with prohibition of trading in 
derivatives; and compensation to low-income countries for acquisition by high-
income countries of their highly skilled personnel, balancing the right of 
freedom of movement against the obligations arising from sponsored education; 
and granting citizenship to willing immigrants after a brief period.  
 Not only are national boundaries and systems of migration control 
associated with different treatment of those inside and those outside a national 
border, they can lead to different treatment of groups within a nation’s borders. 
In the case of apartheid South Africa, its rulers insisted that there was nothing 
peculiar about their arrangements but that they merely reproduced within one 
country the set of principles used globally. They then aimed to make the 
arrangements more defensible by declaring a few pockets of South Africa to be 
separate countries. These pockets, the historic ‘reserves’ or ‘homelands’ were 
where low-income workers would be born and bred, transferred to the ‘white’ 
areas when ready to work, periodically returned to the ‘reserves’ at the end of 
each contract, and permanently returned when old, ill or otherwise no longer 
wanted. While the more skilled types of black labour were permitted to settle 
permanently in South Africa’s cities, the less skilled were admitted only as 
workers without families for fixed-period contracts.  
 In Chapter 21 on “Migration Regimes and the Politics of Insiders-
Outsiders: Japan and South Africa as Distant Mirrors”, Yoichi Mine sees 
parallels between this system of exploitation and the currently practiced and 
promoted arrangements in high-income countries. The system of ‘reserves’ was 
used in many colonial situations, for it allowed employers to avoid 
contributing, or to pay much less, towards the reproduction costs of workers’ 
families. When formal influx control in South Africa was abolished in the 
1990s, the expected massive influx from the reserves did not happen; if poorly 
educated rural dwellers have access to some resources in the ‘reserves’ they do 
not necessarily abandon this, and their homeplace and loved ones, in order to 
take their chances in urban shantytowns. What has happened instead in South 
Africa is an influx of perhaps three million illegal migrants from other African 
countries, who are cheaper and more compliant because they are illegal and 
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thus more attractive to businesses that now face global competition. 
Continuation of strong segmentation in the workforce plays the same roles as 
under apartheid: to divide and rule, and to exploit more intensively particular 
groups. Mine suggests that these principles are at play also in modern-day 
Japan, and elsewhere. In Japan as in most high-income countries, global 
competition increases employers’ interest in cheap labour, and jobs that are 
nowadays considered demanding, dirty, dangerous, or otherwise undesirable, 
are left for immigrants. The Immigration Control Act was amended in 1990 to 
allow corresponding supply, including from Brazilians and Peruvians of 
Japanese background. As discussed in the chapters by Harada and Mushakoji, 
these groups remain largely socially excluded. In addition, a ‘trainees’ system 
has been established to bring in unskilled foreign labour on fixed-term 
contracts, allocated to specific employers and often without protection of labour 
legislation. Such migration regimes in Japan and elsewhere have the same 
rationale as in the apartheid system: to benefit from the labour of groups who 
are kept socially marginal and excluded from most of the benefits that they help 
to produce, and who will have to bear most of their own costs of social 
reproduction. South African history suggests that institutionalization of such 
divisive exploitative systems, with dichotomization of insiders and outsiders, 
jeopardizes social morality and, eventually, social peace. 
 Chapter 22 on “State and Immigrant Diaspora Identity in Contemporary 
Japan: From a Developmentalist National Ethic towards a Multicultural 
Development Ethic of Common Human Security”, by Kinhide Mushakoji, 
offers thoughts on how to inspire and guide moves towards more moral and 
sustainable systems. Mushakoji goes beyond Bagchi, to argue that human rights 
thinking alone will not suffice. He outlines an approach to synthesis of 
collective and individual rights and norms. Without such a synthesis, positive 
Enlightenment values will continue to be perceived in many societies as 
exogenous and will criticised as an imposition of cultural colonialism. 
Universalist and individualist ethics in the tradition of the Western 
Enlightenment must be adapted to allow different identity communities to each 
have an acknowledged and respected right to identity reproduction. The right to 
identity reproduction applies to states but cannot be limited to these. The 
Japanese state enforces this right when it comes to the reproduction of the 
identity of Japanese people and the nation. When it comes to diaspora 
communities, this right is ignored. Like many countries, Japan emphasizes a 
proud and unified national identity as a key value (to be reproduced through the 
education system) that provides a basis for preservation and advancement of the 
nation-state. Such an ethic was articulated in the late 19
th
 century Meiji 
construction of the modern Japanese state, which emphasized loyalty to family, 
superiors and the nation, rather than starting from rights of the individual. 
Under the American occupation in 1947, a new Law on Education emphasized 
instead the formation of responsible individuals. It was replaced in 2006 by a 
new Law that reaffirms the reproduction of a homogeneous unified Japanese 
nation. Like the previous Laws, it covers only Japanese nationals, ignoring non-
nationals residing in Japan. For them the state accepts no responsibility in 
education. In principle, immigrants are expected either to go ‘home’ once they 
have made their economic contribution, or to assimilate and become 
‘completely Japanese’. In Mushakoji’s view, this dichotomous approach creates 
marginalized, unprotected and partly ‘illegal’ immigrant communities operating 
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within a large informal sector. It not only undermines the well-being of the 
immigrants, it undermines also the security of the Japanese state and people.  
Premised on a Westphalian notion of competing nation-states based on 
single identities, the Japanese state views immigrant communities that have not 
been homogenized into the Japanese mainstream as problems, rather than as 
assets who, thanks to their more complex identities provide creative bridges 
between Japan and the rest of the world. In reality, security is only attainable as 
common security, based on respect for assuring each other’s security. It is 
necessary to extend the Bandung Principles, of ‘peaceful coexistence’ and 
‘equal mutual benefit’, to relations between all identity communities, non-state-
based as well as state-based. Mushakoji argues that a human security approach 
recognises this need to empower non-state identity communities and not only 
states, for identity production and reproduction form the basis for practices of 
caring and for every ethical framework. He sets this proposal within a larger 
perspective, of movement towards transcendence of all exclusionary identities 
and towards cross-cultural as well as multi-cultural democracies.  
1.4 Conclusion 
This volume examines the historical experience of cross-border migration in 
recent decades as co-constituted by the enactment of economic 
cosmopolitanism under neoliberal doctrines and pre-existing hierarchical 
relations between societies and peoples. Processes of structural reform on a 
global scale in the last three decades have stimulated multi-scale 
transformations and social re-ordering that generate insecurity and drive 
migration. To help societies find adaptations to the complex realities of 
migration that are integral to globalizing processes, we argue for alternative 
ethical modes of reasoning about the ‘migration-development-security nexus’, 
and for ways of thinking that can transcend dualisms and dichotomies and 
emphasize the relational and processual nature of being. Peoples and societies 
have become inextricably linked through the interconnected processes of 
globalization. It is no longer acceptable to view morally relevant identities as 
only within narrow cultural or territorial boundaries. At the same time, ethical 
reflection here requires understanding the diverse relations between different 
forms of deprivation and responsibility, and the range of emergent subjectivities 
and practices that extant frameworks of cosmopolitanism and universal rights 
do not easily capture. For these reasons we find helpful and have adopted a 
human security approach. 
 
